This article examines the growth of vacant property registration ordinances (VPROs) Acknowledgments:
pose to neighborhoods and local governments. There may also be ancillary objectives, including raising funds to pay for addressing the problems of vacant properties. Ultimately, proponents of VPROs may hope to discourage irresponsible investment by internalizing some of the social costs of vacant properties and holding owners accountable for not maintaining properties in a responsible manner.
VPROs are not without their critics. Opponents of the ordinances have suggested that they may raise the costs of property ownership as well as the costs of servicing delinquent loans and foreclosed properties.
3 This in turn, VPRO opponents argue, may discourage firms from investing and lending in areas covered by such ordinances. For example, the Mortgage Bankers Association claim that VPROs will:
...further deteriorate the mortgage market by placing unreasonable requirements upon servicers. Mortgage market participants will have no choice but to respond to these unreasonable requirements by significantly reducing their current business or ceasing to make further investments in the communities with unreasonable registration ordinances. 4 However, proponents of VPROs are likely to reject such assertions and argue that costs imposed by VPROs represent a portion of the true costs of owning and managing vacant property, which should be considered by investors and lenders in their investment and 3 For a critical perspective on VPROs, see Hirokawa and Gonzalez (2010) , who suggest that "the timing of these ordinances is ill-advised (if ever there was a good time)." For more favorable perspectives, see Davis (2012) , Martin (2010) , and Schilling (2009). underwriting decisions. By reallocating the costs of vacant properties to the appropriate private parties and away from neighborhoods and local governments, the VPRO should encourage responsible investment and lending, and discourage irresponsible investment and speculation as well as overly risky lending.
Without more comprehensive and detailed information on VPROs, proponents and critics of such ordinances are left without the data needed to evaluate the effects of ordinances -and different ordinance characteristics -on lending and investment patterns. The debate will remain one of theory and rhetoric, rather than one based on actual housing market behavior.
The rapid adoption of VPROs across the country has met with significant political resistance. After the City of Chicago proposed an ordinance in 2008 requiring the use of metal instead of plywood to secure windows and doors, the Mortgage Bankers Association, together with Safeguard Properties, formed the "Vacant Property Registration Committee" in which regular conference calls were conducted to track and advocate around VPROs (Schilling, 2009; Martin, 2010) . Schilling (2009) argues, "the MBA and Safeguard do not technically oppose the concept of registering vacant properties, but they would like a process and set of property maintenance requirements that would be similar to industry standards." 5 Up until this point, limited information on VPROs has been available, including on the coverage of the ordinances, their requirements for physical security, insurance, etc., and the penalties for noncompliance (e.g., fines). The two most comprehensive treatments on VPROs are those by Davis (20120, Martin (2010) , and Schilling (2009) . Martin (2010) presents some quantitative cataloging of the growth in ordinances up until 2009, and analyzes growth according 5 Lind's (2011) portrayal of the MBA and Safeguard's actions is one of lobbying against VPROs. A senior staff member of Safeguard Properties has written that "if every city in the U.S. enacted a VPR ordinance, the challenges of vacant properties would not go away; in fact, they would likely get worse (Halpern, 2011). to a broad classification of ordinance types. 6 The continued growth in the number of ordinances around the country has rendered the information in this study of somewhat limited use by this point, however. Moreover, the large numbers of characteristics of VPROs calls for a more exhaustive database on VPROs that detail the characteristics needed to understand the level and nature of variation among ordinances and to identify any patterns that might emerge.
A key purpose of this project was to develop a database of VPROs that would provide the sorts of information necessary to understand the nature of VPROs more fully and to determine differences among ordinances. Ultimately, the database could be used to evaluate the impact of different types of ordinances on local housing market conditions as Fitzpatrick et al. (2012) Davis (2012) , Martin (2010), and Schilling (2009) provide many examples of detailed features of various ordinances, such as escalating fees, expanded definitions of covered properties, and other components. 7 There is also a modest (thus far) trend in states enacting statues relative to vacant property registration of statewide applicability. Some states (Texas, Virginia, Georgia) have passed laws explicitly setting forth the nature and extent of the authority of local government to enact local VPROs. Two states (Connecticut and Maryland) have enacted statewide registration requirements of some kind. At least some of these laws appear to be aimed primarily at weakening or preempting local VPROs. For example, some (e.g., Connecticut and Virginia) enable owners to avoid local, public registration by utilizing some sort of private-sector registration system, and others (e.g., Georgia, Texas) limit fines or fees that localities can impose (Connecticut, 2009; Georgia, 2012; Texas, 2009; Virginia, 2009 ). Because Connecticut is the only state requiring statewide registration during the period of this study (prior to May 2012), Connecticut localities are not included in any of the analyses here. (The Maryland foreclosure registration law for foreclosed properties was not enacted until May 2, 2012, so Maryland ordinances are not excluded.) The data analyzed here represents only the contents of the local VPROs and not any preemptive or constraining effect of any state law on a VPRO. For example, if a local VPRO requires local, public registration, but state law preempts the local ordinance and allows an owner, as an alternative, to list the property in an industry database, this is not necessarily reflected in the Vacant Properties Registration Ordinance Database developed for this project.
Why VPROs?
The problems associated with vacant and abandoned properties in urban communities are not new ones. Long-term population loss in many parts of the industrial Midwest and Northeast, associated especially with industrial restructuring, created increased vacancy and abandonment beginning in the latter decades of the twentieth century (Mallach, 2006) . In the early 1970s, many cities were affected by surges in vacant homes fueled by property flipping schemes related to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 235 loan program (Bratt, 2009 ). In the late 1990s, after the first major boom in subprime lending, many cities faced problems of spatially concentrated foreclosed properties and their associated social costs. However, the national foreclosure crisis beginning in 2007 resulted in unprecedented surges in vacant homes across many metropolitan areas, including regions that had not experienced significant vacancy problems earlier (Hollander, 2011) . There is considerable evidence that foreclosures and vacant properties have negative impacts on neighboring property values and social conditions (Harding, Rosenblatt and Yao, 2008; Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin, 2011; Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Whitaker and Fitzpatrick, 2011 However, despite its considerable magnitude relative to other federal community development funding, NSP has generally not been viewed as sufficient to address the problem of much larger numbers of foreclosed, vacant, and abandoned properties in the last decade. 9 With the increased fiscal stress brought on by the housing crisis and the Great Recession, localities are left with few tools other than their powers to regulate land use and protect the public from the hazards and costs posed by vacant and neglected properties. Alexander and Powell (2011) outline five key groups of strategies that localities can use to address problems posed by vacant properties. These include: 1) improving the local tax foreclosure system; 2) improving code enforcement systems and management; 3) placing problem properties under court-appointed receivership; 4) creating local land banks; and 5) adopting vacant property registration ordinances. VPROs have proved to be among the most popular of these approaches.
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Previous Research on VPROs
Schilling (2009), Martin (2010) , and Davis (2012) have discussed and described VPROs, and have developed similar typologies of VPROs that are built upon here. Martin (2010) describes two fundamental types of ordinances: the "classic model" and the "Chula Vista model." The classic model has also been called the "Wilmington model" (Schilling, 2009) and here is simply be called the "Vacancy and Abandonment Model". The Chula Vista model has also been called the "Foreclosure Model," the term that is used here.
The key difference between these two models is the event that triggers the requirement to register properties with the locality and comply with the ordinance's other requirements. The
Vacancy and Abandonment Model is an ordinance that requires property owners to register properties after a certain length of vacancy. The locality frequently collects fees from the owner for as long as the property remains vacant and, in some ordinances, these fees may escalate over time (e.g., the annual fee is higher in year two than in year one). These ordinances require contact information for responsible parties to be included in the registration. Vacancy and Abandonment ordinances vary across a broad variety of characteristics. Examples include the definitions of "vacancy" and "abandonment", the coverage of property types (residential vs. 10 Fitzpatrick et al. (2012) also consider point-of-sale and escrow ordinances, together with VPROs, as three types of "anti-vacancy and anti-blight ordinances." The focus here is only on VPROs. commercial), exemptions (e.g., for actively marketed properties), maximum fine amounts and how the fines are structured (e.g., per violation or per violation per day), whether and which violations trigger criminal violations, whether insurance (liability and/or casualty) or bonding is required, and whether localities can waive or adjust penalties in negotiation with property owners in order to encourage remediation or redevelopment.
The Foreclosure Model is an ordinance in which registration is triggered by some foreclosure-related event. In the Foreclosure Model, registration is typically triggered by a formal, state-required notice of default or intent to foreclose that is filed as a part of a judicial proceeding or advertised by the mortgagee or servicer as a part of a nonjudicial foreclosure process. One reason that this model was developed was that localities were finding that some properties where foreclosures had been initiated were being vacated well before the foreclosure sale was complete and the property became owned by the mortgagee (or another new owner). Martin (2010) notes that while some foreclosure ordinances require the lender to inspect a property and secure it according to the ordinance once the trigger has occurred, others merely require registration (and potentially fees) at that point. The former ordinances frequently rely on the "waste and abandonment clause" common in many mortgage documents. However, lenders have resisted VPROs requiring them to take steps to secure a property before they assume title in part because of the costs they expect to incur in doing so. Martin (2010) recognizes that many, especially more recently enacted, ordinances include characteristics of both the vacancy and abandonment model and the Foreclosure Model. In large part this means that many ordinances are triggered either by vacancy or by foreclosure-related actions. We classify such ordinances as following a "Hybrid Model."
Within these three ordinance types (Vacancy and Abandonment, Foreclosure, and Hybrid) there are many variations in specific terms and requirements.
11 Coverage and exemptions vary, as do requirements for securing, maintaining and insuring the property.
Enforcement while somewhat uniform in fundamental structure (the use of fines as the primary tool), also varies, with some localities specifying at least some violations as criminal (misdemeanor) offenses and others not. Maximum fine amounts also vary significantly.
Another feature of some VPROs is the exemption of properties that are registered with industry databases. Originally, the main industry database for use by mortgagees or property owners to avoid municipal registration had been one developed by the Mortgage Bankers Association and Safeguard Properties, and implemented under the industry cooperative, the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). The MBA/MERS system provided an online look-up system in which eligible local code enforcement officials would be able to look up a property and identify key responsible parties, including a field servicing agent, to whom they could address complaints and address issues. With the increasing troubles associated with MERS more generally, Safeguard began promoting a service named "Compliance Connections"
to provide an alternative to local registration (Lind, 2011) . In some ordinances, and under some state laws, MERS registration effectively removes the need to register a property in a local, public registration database.
One key question for those studying VPROs is their enforceability. This is a difficult issue to assess across jurisdictions and would require the collection of survey data from local officials. Besides the actual citations and fines imposed by local authorities, an important issue is what tools the locality has to collect fines and whether it uses such tools in an aggressive manner.
11 We also found rare instances of ordinances that fall outside of these three models. We identified six ordinances that covered either all properties or all absentee-owned properties. See Figure 1 .
Most ordinances permit the fines to be accompanied by liens on the property in question, similar to the enforcement of nuisance abatement or housing code ordinances. However the priority of VPRO liens varies across states (Martin, 2010) . In some states VPRO and nuisance abatement liens are given "super priority" over mortgages and other liens, thus having similar status as property tax liens. In other states, VPRO and similar liens are subordinate to mortgages, thus being a significantly less powerful tool for enforcement purposes.
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Research on the effects of VPROs is extremely scarce. This is expected given the relatively recent popularity of such laws. Simple, before-and-after comparisons have shown declines in vacant properties in some jurisdictions after adoption of an ordinance (e.g., U.S.
Conference of Mayors, 2006) . However, the only known, rigorous study of the effects of VPROs on housing markets or property conditions, in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, found no appreciable effect of VPROs on a number of housing market indicators (Fitzpatrick et al., 2012) . Thus far, no studies have found negative impacts of VPROs on local housing markets. Further research is needed in this area, including work that takes into account the potentially differential impacts of such ordinances with respect to different types of properties (e.g., commercial versus residential, low-value vs. high-value, etc.) and housing market conditions.
Development of the Vacant Property Registration Ordinance (VPRO) Database
The initial raw data on VPROs comes from the firm Safeguard Properties, Inc., which has provided a frequently updated list of VPROs for several years. Safeguard is nationally recognized as a leading provider of asset management services for loan servicers and lenders.
However, the Safeguard list provides little descriptive information on the ordinances. Beginning 12 The use of super-priority liens is discussed in Alexander and Powell (2011). with the Safeguard Properties database on VPROs, we identified 552 ordinances for which we were able to find some significant documentation describing the ordinance (in the vast majority of cases, the copy of the full ordinance was obtained). 13 Each ordinance was coded into more than 30 variables that describe each ordinance. Beyond these very basic differences, one key factor in determining local VPRO adoption is the constitutional and/or legislative authority of localities within a state to enact and implement VPROs. Some states, such as Nevada, are strong Dillon's rule states, in which the authority to pass laws such as VPROs must be expressly granted by state statute and home rule is generally quite limited and specified (Nevada, 2012 Because most of the growth in VPROs occurred after the early 2000s, it is helpful to look more closely at the states with many ordinances to see where VPROs grew most during different 16 Even when a state grants authority to local governments to enact VPROs, there may be constraints. For example, the 2009 Texas law explicitly giving localities the ability to adopt VPROs is limited to municipalities in counties with populations of 1.5 million or more. This is likely to restrict the growth of VPROs by limiting the number of localities explicitly authorized to enact ordinances (Texas, 2009 ). In addition, in some state laws, there are also strong constraints on the fees and/or fines that can be levied in local ordinances, which might discourage localities from bothering to enact laws that they might expect to be ineffectual. However, in response to the surge in such ordinances, by spring of 2012, opponents of local VPROs had gotten a state law passed essentially preempting all but relatively weak ordinances (Georgia, 2012) .
A Regional Analysis of VPROs
We now look more closely at the regional distribution of VPROs and whether the ordinances appear to vary in any obvious ways by region of the country. We identify nine regions according to Table 1 . However, localities in Connecticut are omitted from all analyses due to its statewide vacant property registration statute (Connecticut, 2009 ). 17 It should be noted that the Plains and the Southwest regions both had few enacted VPROs in total as of May 1, 2012, with 9 and 10 ordinances respectively, so percentages should be read understanding the small raw numbers involved.
Some Potential Indicators of Ordinance Strength
The complexity of VPROs makes it difficult to develop a simple measure of the "strength" or "rigor" of an ordinance. In fact, any concept of strength is likely to be somewhat subjective and depend on a combination of a variety of characteristics, including coverage of the ordinance (which types of properties are covered or excluded), requirements (e.g. maintenance, security, insurance, etc.), and sanctions or penalties (fines, criminal penalties, liens, etc.).
Moreover, there may be tradeoffs between different characteristics. As an example, localities may specify higher maximum fines, but this may be partly related to their exclusion of a larger number of property types.
18
Actual implementation and enforcement actions (actual inspections, utilization of sanctions or penalties) are another aspect of the strength of local law. Unfortunately, data on enforcement actions would be extremely difficult to obtain and the database developed here does not address such actions. However, it does contain data on many other characteristics that might be used to measure ordinance strength. Although no one or two variables in the database will provide a comprehensive measure of ordinance strength, some can be used to measure specific indicators that might be expected to be correlated with overall ordinance strength.
18 Martin (2010) also argues that the complexity and heterogeneity of ordinances reflects differing goals among the adopting localities. He breaks down ordinance goals into two general types: 1) maintaining and securing vacant properties in an effort to preserve home values while awaiting future, improved economic conditions; and 2) shifting the burdens of blighted, vacant properties onto property owners and lenders, thereby encouraging them to either rehabilitate them or demolish them.
As an example, we can look at the maximum fine amount indicated in each ordinance. Another aspect of the strength of VPROs is coverage. One dimension of coverage, in turn, is whether the ordinance spells out many different types of exclusions. Examples of properties excluded from coverage by a VPRO include those that are "actively marketed," those with a building permit for rehabilitation/construction, those under contract for sale or lease, those with no code violations, those owned by a nonprofit, and many others. The database characterizes the exemptions into 17 categories (including "none specified"). VPROs had somewhere between zero and five types of exemptions.
22 Figure 9 shows that, nationally, one third of VPROs have at least one form of exemption, with seven percent having more than three types of exemptions. The number of specified exemptions varies by region. In the Southeast, Midsouth, West, and MidAtlantic regions, over three quarters of ordinances had no exemptions specified. Conversely, in the Northeast, Midwest, and Plains, fewer than 50 percent of VPROs had no exemptions.
Maintenance and security requirements are another aspect of VPROs. For example, most
VPROs require property owners to physically secure property in some way (e.g., boarding 22 Beyond explicit exemptions in local ordinances is the issue of enforceability of the ordinance against all owners or mortgagees. One of the more aggressive VPROs, that of the City of Chicago, has been challenged in court by the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the governmentsponsored secondary market firms. The agency seeks exemption of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from the ordinance. windows) to prevent entrance by vandals, squatters, or others.
23 For the U.S. as a whole, Figure   10 shows that 74 percent of ordinances have some sort of a requirement that the property be secured against entry. One ordinance (Chicago) specifically mandates that this security be of metal construction (wood is not sufficient), and another 15 ordinances do not allow wood board to be used when securing the property. The degree to which the physical securing of property (of any type) is required varies substantially by region, from a high of 94 percent in the West to a low of 33 percent in the MidAtlantic. In regions that accounted for the large majority of new ordinances after 2008 (the West, Southeast and Midwest) at least three-quarters of ordinances required properties to by physically secured. While not at all definitive of the strength of an ordinance, these four simple measuresmaximum fine, criminal penalties, number of exclusions, and some level of physical security requirement -provide some evidence regarding various aspects of the relative strength or weakness of an ordinance. A fuller analysis of ordinance strength requires a more precise or developed concept of "strength," one that will be somewhat subjective and may vary based on whether one focuses more on dimensions of coverage, requirements, or penalties.
Conclusion
This analysis shows that the popularity of local VPROs in the U.S. has continued to grow across the U.S. Even three to four years after the beginning of the U.S. foreclosure crisis in 2007, localities were continuing to adopt VPROs at a substantial pace, although the rate of growth has slowed since the peak of the crisis. 2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  FL  0  0  0  15  31  33  14  CA  1  0  4  44  25  11  5  IL  2  3  2  13  12  15  9  MI  1  1  1  5  15  17  7  OH  1  2  3  5  6  3  10  MA  0  0  1  10  9  4  3  MN  0  1  0  0  5  3  5  GA  1  1  0  2  2  3 
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